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Abstract
Highly complex and specialized care plans sometimes overwhelm
the comprehension of patients and families. Many optimistic
surrogates of critically ill patients err on the side of desiring that
everything be done but with a nebulous idea of what ‘everything’
entails. Physicians must work closely to educate surrogates as to
the benefits versus the risks of treatment. Our roundtable experts
ponder the question of whether providers possess the authority to
interpret unilaterally the nature of requests for everything.
Introduction
There is always an incentive to use the newest, most
interesting medication as soon as possible. There is a
perception that new drugs are miracle drugs since they are
formulated against the cutting edge of new developments in
medicine. Frequently, patients and their families carry out
Internet searches for new developments in the field of their
interest, and there is much information available. Patients and
their families often point out these new developments to their
physicians and request they be implemented.
Patients are biased to try anything in hopes of a cure.
Physicians have a strong incentive to do everything
reasonable for their patients, but not necessarily everything
possible. If a new drug is available, even as an investigational
tool, there is a temptation to use it. But the wealth of
knowledge concerning these treatments differs widely
between physicians and patients. We explore the viability of
requests for "everything", differences between possibilities and
reason and authority to request treatment and to demand it.
The case
A 70-year-old woman with a history of hypertension and deep
vein thrombosis on coumadin (warfarin) is admitted to the
emergency department (ED) about 1 hour after a syncopal
episode and is found to have a small left-sided intracranial
hemorrhage. Initially she is hemiplegic, aphasic but arousable,
and with stable hemodynamics and ventilation. She is admitted
to the intensive care unit (ICU) and given fresh frozen plasma
and vitamin K for an international normalized ratio (INR) of 5.6.
Her examination findings quickly deteriorate. Another computed
tomography scan is performed an hour after admission and it is
observed that the intracranial bleed is rapidly increasing in size.
Repeat examination reveals no corneals, fixed pupils, and only
extension of the left arm in response to painful stimulus. She is
intubated and breathes over the ventilator but has no cough or
gag reflex. Fresh frozen plasma is infused. Both neurosurgery
and neurology consultants agree that the real chances of this
patient leaving the hospital alive are nil, and the family is so
advised. The patient’s husband insists that everything be done.
He states that the patient is a ‘fighter‘ and would want
everything possible to be done, at least for a while. The family is
also willing to pay for the medication out of their own pocket if
required.
Recent literature, although early and still in trials, suggests
that outcomes for patients with intracranial hemorrhage are
improved following administration of recombinant factor VIIa
(rFVIIa), and this treatment is routinely used in many centers
for treatment of intracranial hemorrhage. However, rFVIIa is
expensive and in short supply. It is the opinion of the critical
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care physician that although rFVIIa is one possible option,
administering it to this patient would not improve her outcome
or, worse, it might convert inevitable death to a vegetative
state. However, the critical care physician reminds him that
the family wants ‘everything’ done, and the team must serve
that mandate until the family changes their mind and opts for
some kind of limitation – ‘everything means everything
possible’. The critical care physician states his further opinion
that the definition of ‘everything’ doesn’t mean ‘everything
possible’ but in reality means ‘everything reasonable’, and
that the critical care team has the right to interpret care in that
light.
Should the family be told that there is more aggressive
treatment available but that the team has decided it would not
be beneficial to this patient?
The Canadian perspective
Christopher Doig
In Canada medical care follows the traditional principles of
medical ethics espoused in the Code of Ethics of the
Canadian Medical Association (CMA) [1]. The Code states
that one should ‘Ascertain whenever possible and recognize
[the patient’s or surrogate’s] wishes about the initiation,
continuation, or cessation of life-sustaining treatments’.
Canadian courts recognize that life-sustaining medical
treatment may be withheld or withdrawn, and that treatment
may not always be in a patient’s best interests.
What is not defined are limits of autonomy in demanding
ineffective or inappropriate treatment. In 1995, the CMA – in
collaboration with multiple other health agencies – approved
The Joint Statement on Resuscitative Interventions [2]. This
guideline recommends that patients be assigned to one of
four categories when one is considering whether
resuscitative interventions are appropriate (although focusing
on cardiopulmonary resuscitation [CPR], resuscitative
interventions are more than CPR): patients who are likely to
benefit, those in whom benefit is uncertain, those in whom
benefit is unlikely, and those who will not benefit. The
Statement clarifies that ‘These categories can be adapted to
… the care setting and are compatible with policies that
establish levels of care or intervention.’ The Statement
provides guidance on decision making and communication:
‘… [patients] who almost certainly will not benefit from CPR
[or other resuscitative interventions] are not candidates …
and it should not be presented as a treatment option.’
At least two prominent medical ethicists have argued that
denying treatment based on the Joint Statement may not be
appropriate. Weijer [3], in an editorial on refusing to provide
CPR to patients in a persistent vegetative state, stated ‘I
believe … failure of physicians to provide treatment is neither
ethically or legally defensible … Futility bundles uncontro-
versial cases involving treatment that cannot work with cases
involving effective treatment that supports uncontroversial
ends e.g. preserving permanent unconsciousness.’ Baylis [4]
stated that neither the Canadian health care system nor a
broad social consensus has conferred upon physicians the
authority to make unilateral decisions about futile treatment.
Likewise, Picard and Robertson [5], Canadian health law
experts, caution that there are ‘dangers and problems
underlying the concept of medical futility, particularly if …
used to justify the withholding of treatment for socio-
economic and value-laden reasons.’
Although there is apparent incongruence between the CMA’s
Joint Statement and the opinion of some Canadian experts in
ethics and health law, there is no requirement to provide
treatments that fall outside standard medical practice. As
Weijer and coworkers [6] wrote in their article on inappropriate
treatment, there is no obligation to provide treatment that
cannot work or is very unlikely to work, or that falls outside the
bounds of standard medical practice. Standard medical
practice would be defined as one of at least the following: an
intervention that is used by at least a respectable minority of
experts; one that is licensed by Health Canada’s Therapeutic
Products Directorate for the specific use; or one that is
supported by scientific evidence of safety and efficacy, or for
which there is clear evidence that it is not harmful or ineffective.
Thus, on the basis of standard care alone, without appeal to
medical futility, in Canada, it is my opinion that clinicians would
have a sound basis for refusing to provide rFVIIa.
The American perspective
Holt Murray
In this case we are forced to determine what ‘everything’
means. Families frequently express that they want everything
to be done for their loved one. This is, of course, a natural and
reasonable request, especially for patients faced with a
sudden devastating condition following previously normal
health. The ethical practice of medicine requires that we
define ‘everything’ as ‘everything reasonable’.
If this patient were to have stage IVb pancreatic cancer, then
distinguishing between everything possible and everythingPage 3 of 7
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reasonable would be easier. It would be possible to perform a
Whipple procedure; however, this course of action would be
far from reasonable or ethical. The patient would be
subjected to a procedure with its inherent complications
without receiving benefit.
In order to maintain a healthy doctor-patient relationship,
patients and their surrogates need to know that the
recommendations that they receive will be reasonable and
responsible. This case implies that the patient’s surrogate
desires a therapy that the medical team does not think is
indicated. Simply, it would be unethical for the team to
provide such a treatment course that is not felt to be
medically indicated. This conflict is usually resolved by simple
discussion or, in rare cases, by obtaining a third party opinion.
Recombinant medications may revolutionize the way in which
medicine is practiced. The high cost of these medications
and their limited availability mandate that we use them in a
thoughtful manner. rFVIIa may prove to be a very powerful
tool in the management of intracranial hemorrhage. To date,
the literature is compelling but not definitive. Unfortunately, it
is being considered late in the patient’s course, when the
likelihood of meaningful recovery has been determined to be
nil by all involved parties. In addition to a vanishingly small
potential benefit, the patient is at risk for significant harm with
her history of recent deep venous thrombosis. Overall, the
patient is unlikely to benefit and may acquire harm from the
proposed intervention. The scenario presented is very similar
to the patient with stage IVb pancreatic cancer; neither the
Whipple nor the rFVIIa should be considered reasonable
therapeutic options.
The physician has an additional, sometimes competing
responsibility. This is a mandate to utilize scarce resources in
a responsible manner. Resource allocation decisions are
inherently difficult. The more expensive and scarce the
resource, the higher the level of evidence we should require
before routine use. Although initial reports with rVIIa are
encouraging, more data are needed. Consequently, an ethical
obligation exists to study and determine how and when to
prescribe off-label use of any new drug before it may be
considered a local standard of care. We must avoid being
seduced by the latest and greatest medication available, and





In my opinion, when dealing with issues such as the one
presented in this case, the critical care physician should
apply the rule of the five Cs: competence, care, compassion,
communication and collegiality.
The first C is paramount. Without the highest level of
competence, the others represent inadequate surrogates for
what the family and the patient probably want. In this
particular case, it is absolutely vital to know the facts and
literature in detail before one may consider what to say. rFVIIa
has indeed been tested in a multicenter multinational
randomized controlled trial [7] and was shown to decrease
hematoma enlargement, disability, and 90-day mortality.
However, the trial specifically excluded patients with known
recent use of oral anticoagulants and patients with a
Glasgow Coma Scale score of 3-5. The 70-year-old woman
presented in this case satisfied both exclusion criteria. Thus,
there is no evidence to suggest a beneficial effect of rFVIIa in
this particular patient. Furthermore, any reasonably
competent and experienced ICU clinician would recognize
that this patient is irretrievably ill and that the focus of
management should change from interventional management
to the Cs of care and compassion.
The family should be spoken to in a separate quiet room; they
should be given a chance to understand and grieve. They
should be consoled by explanations that their beloved
mother/wife/sister/grandmother is not suffering. They should
be touched and hugged to show a sense of common
humanity and sympathy. If religious, they should be given a
chance to involve representatives of their religion. They
should be allowed to be at the bedside and offered some
privacy (single room/curtains drawn) if they wish to spend
some time with their dying relative.
In the appropriate circumstances and with the appropriate
family, issues of continued support for another 24-48 hours
should be discussed, because this patient might become an
organ donor. The possibility of prolonging life until the time of
possible brain death for the purpose of organ donation raises
important and complex ethical issues. If discussed, the
reasons for it should be made explicit and clear and the joint
decision fully documented.
I also believe that the C of communication should not only
apply to the family but also to colleagues. In my opinion, the
care of this patient at presentation to the ED was suboptimal.
She presented with a condition that carries a mortality rate in
excess of 60% and with an INR of 5.6 [8]. This presentation
demands immediate action. In Australia the guidelines are
clear; this patient should have received 10 mg vitamin K
intravenously, 50 IU of prothrombin complex concentrate, and
fresh frozen plasma. This should have been followed,
immediately after the initial therapy, by measurement of INR
and thromboelastography and further treatment until bothbecame normal. Because the effect of such treatment might
wane with time, frequent monitoring to ensure persistent
normalization should continue for at least 24 hours (the time
needed for vitamin K to be fully effective). Communication of
these concepts to ED physicians is of ethical importance and
should occur with the utmost collegiality (the last C) and in a
blame-free manner by means of educational sessions and
academic detailing.
To my way of thinking, this is the most important ethical
aspect of the case – ensuring better care for the next
patient.
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The Dutch perspective
Michael Kuiper
Would I, being a critical care attending working in The
Netherlands, give a treatment that I am convinced would not
improve the outcome for this particular patient, if the family
demanded that ‘everything done’? If not, should I tell the
family about all possible but, in my view, futile treatments
available?
Treatment in The Netherlands of this patient would be more
or less the same as described in the case report above. I
would intubate if it were necessary to protect the airway
during the diagnostic period. Awaiting a decision about
prognosis, I would treat the coagulation problem; I would also
use prothrombin complex concentrate (factors II, VII, IX, and
X) to antagonize the effect of coumadin. When the diagnosis
of intracerebral hemorrhage is made, I would discuss whether
we should admit her to the ICU. If the neurologist, the
neurosurgeon, and I are convinced that the chances of
recovery are nil, then I would enter into a discussion with the
husband and children, and stop treatment then and there in
the ED.
So, would I – while convinced of the inevitability of the
patient’s demise – use a drug for which we have still only
limited evidence that it may reduce the volume of the
intracerebral bleed and thus improve outcome?
Which ethical principle would help in answering this question
[9]? Applying the principle of beneficence and nonmale-
ficence would lead to the reasoning that treatment with rFVIIa
would most likely not benefit the patient, and that – on the
other hand – treatment would not harm her, except for the
possibility that she will remain in a vegetative state rather than
progressing to death.
Would the principle of distributive justice be applicable? We
have rFVIIa readily available in our hospital but it is used under
strict supervision of the intensivists. Currently, the hospital and
not the patient or insurance company will pay the bill if we use
it, and we agreed that we would only use it in cases of
otherwise uncontrollable hemorrhage and thus limit its use to
an estimated 10-12 patients per year. If I start to use it for
other indications, then it may well be possible that I cannot
use it for patients who are more likely to benefit from its use.
Then there is the principle of futility. rFVIIa may limit the
volume of the intracerebral bleed, but it will not improve the
patient’s current condition – a condition that is devastating.
Because the condition is not reversible with rFVIIa, this
treatment may be considered futile.
Autonomy of the patient is not compromised in my view. The
husband may see this differently, however, because he has
stated his wish that everything should be done.
If the patient is in the ICU, comatose and ventilated, and the
husband were to ask me whether there are treatment options, I
would answer that we have done everything that could have
helped, and that other treatments would not improve her
condition. Telling the family about all possible treatments,
proven or not, would not in my view lead to a better informed
family, but only confuse the situation and increase their suffering.
We should instead concentrate our care on the grieving family.
The Brazilian perspective
Rubens Costa
I question whether physicians should cause more stress and
dissention within the family by presenting optimistic data
gained from different patient populations.  With respect to the
specific treatment option under discussion, there does not
seem to be sufficient evidence to justify widespread use of
this new medication on demand. rFVIIa was not developed for
use in a clinical situation such as that described in this case.
The exclusion criteria for clinical use of rFVIIa could result in
disagreements among medical staff, and may even amplify
problems with family decision making if families become
aware of them through the popular press.
According to the most recent report in this field [7], the
exclusion criteria for use of rFVIIa include a Glasgow Coma
Scale score of 3-5 (deep coma); planned surgical evacuation
of hematoma within 24 hours after admission; known use of
oral anticoagulant agents; and symptomatic thrombotic or
vaso-occlusive disease, including deep vein thrombosis,within 30 days before the onset of symptoms of intracerebral
hemorrhage. Furthermore, in that study treatment was given
no later than 4 hours after the onset of symptoms. These
exclusions negatively impact the statement:  ‘…this treatment
[rFVIIa] is routinely used in many centers for intracranial
hemorrhage’. In Brazil and many other countries, it is not yet
in routine use for the reasons given above.
The US Food and Drug Administration has established a
compassionate care program to provide unproven but
promising new drugs to patients with life-threatening illness
while clinical trials are being conducted. However, this
program requires some evidence that the drug has a safe
and effective therapeutic profile. That evidence is lacking for
this patient's scenario. Here, the attending critical care
physician appropriately explores the term 'everything
possible' based on the bioethical principle of 'first, do no
harm'.
The progression of this patient's devastating disease would
not be halted with conventional therapy. Unproven remedies
present difficult decisions because there may be little
information on safety and effectiveness for this particular
scenario. If the physician knew that the unproven drug was as
safe and cheap as, for instance, vitamin C, then he probably
would not object to its application. On the other hand, if the
drug is as potentially dangerous and ineffective, and is very
expensive as in the present case, then prudent physicians
should refuse to participate in its use.
The prudent physician should endeavor to portray accurately
the potential benefit of treatment both honestly and fairly, and
in accordance with evidence-based criteria. In this manner,
the family can appreciate the medical situation and the
options available, and make a clinically beneficial decision.
Sometimes family members or surrogates ask for medically
inappropriate interventions on the basis of unrealistic
optimism. Family members may impose their own values on
incompetent patients. 
In evaluating family member's requests, physicians must
compare the medical risks associated with any intervention to
its benefits. In some cases, the medical risks may be so
serious that they justify the physician's refusal to provide the
requested therapy regardless of the family's optimism.
In this case I believe it is inappropriate to discuss this 'ultra-
early haemostatic therapy', as described by Mayer and
coworkers [7], with the family. rFVIIa administration would not
be appropriate because additional harm could be caused,
and there would be very little, if any, benefit at a great cost.
We must convey the true perspective to the family and then
effectively deal effectively with the their psychological and
psychosocial issues as best we can. In most similar
situations, family members and physicians can negotiate a
mutually acceptable plan. In others the risks may be so great
or the standard care may be so clear that the physician is
justified or obligated to refuse the family member's or
surrogate wishes.
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The French perspective
Elie Azoulay
After years of heated debate opposing autonomy and
paternalism, a model in which decision making is shared with
family members – the ‘shared decision making model’
(SDMM) – is gaining precedence [1]. This model upholds
patient autonomy without forcing family members to be
involved in decisions that they do not want to make or are not
ready to make. The SDMM stands in sharp contrast to
paternalism, in which the physician shields the patient,
making decisions alone in order to protect the patient and
family from the potentially harmful effects of making painful
decisions. This model, which emphasizes an active role for
surrogates in sharing decisions and discussions, finds its
rationale in the five following points. First, the family protects
the patient’s best interests. Second, relatives are not mere
visitors in the ICU; they are the most affected by the nature of
any decision, and there is moral justification for surrogate
decision making. Third, the SDMM is integrated in a proactive
communication approach, in which early and effective
information empowers family members and provides them
with the ability to understand the patient’s situation and to
perceive satisfactorily the goals of care. Fourth, qualitative
studies in bereaved families have highlighted the fact that
involving relatives in the decisions, if they so wish and if they
are supported by the ICU team, can help them to cope with
the distress and provide them with opportunities to vent
emotions and find meaning in the shift from curative to
palliative care. Finally, the SDMM can be a means to prevent
ICU conflicts with family members.
In this ethics roundtable debate, the patient is cared for by an
ICU team that has identified a situation in which all hope of
recovery is lost and life-prolonging treatments become death-
prolonging treatments that should be withdrawn or withheld.
Before addressing the question asked, we should recall that,
like 95% of critically ill dying patients, the patient is
incompetent and cannot be part of the decision-making
process. Therefore, sharing in end-of-life decisions shifts to
the patient’s husband (an informal surrogate decision maker).
In this situation, concern that curative care may be harmful
has been voiced by the ICU team, which then broached the
issue with the patient’s husband, who indicates that ‘she
would want everything possible to be done’.To address the question asked, we must balance the
strengths and the risks of telling the family everything. On one
hand, anxiety or depression in family members should not be
used to justify benevolent paternalism. On the other hand,
when family members have not received optimal information,
involving them in the decision-making process probably
carries a risk for subsequent post-traumatic stress and
abnormal grief reactions.
In this situation, I believe that, without asking them to
decide, the family should be told that there are more
aggressive treatments available but that these options
would not be beneficial to the patient. End-of-life decisions
are made by communicating openly and often with the
family. From the beginning of the decision-making process,
the family members should participate by bearing witness to
the patient’s wishes. Most families accept and understand
the need for end-of-life decisions. When this is not the
case, negotiations between ICU staff and family may rapidly
put an end to the conflict. Nevertheless, inadequate
information or economic restrictions imposed by managed
care may lead families to view end-of-life decisions with
distrust. This might have led the family to state that they
would be ‘willing to pay for the medication out of their own
pocket if required’.
In case the husband disagrees with the decision to withhold
rFVIIa, it is implicitly recommended that physicians refrain
from implementing their decision over the objections of the
family. On the contrary, physicians should intensify
communication with families, initiate a process of negotiation,
seek external advice, or show families that the decision is
consistent with institutional policies and recommendations
issued by learned societies. Along this line, a recent law
regulating end-of-life issues in France recommends that
surrogates at least be informed of end-of-life decisions. This
decision should also be mentioned in the medical chart – a
document potentially accessible to family members.
Critical Care    Vol 10 No 5 Doig et al.
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Conclusion
David Crippen
There are two issues here: first whether the physicians have a
higher duty to the family’s desires than to their clinical
intuition; and second whether the family might have legal
recourse against the physicians for disregarding their specific
desires that ‘everything’ be done.
This is not a question of the drug’s efficacy or a quality of life
debate. This is a question of what the term ‘everything’ means
and who is authorized to interpret it. Clearly, the family did not
request futile care in the classic sense. They did not ask the
physician to drill a hole in the patient’s skull and let evil vapors
out. They simply asked for the physicians to do ‘everything’
possible that ‘might’ improve the patient’s outcome – not a
guarantee. The available literature does not have to state
definitively that rFVIIa has proven benefit. It only has to be
demonstrated that the chances of benefit exceed those of
potential detriment.
In the array of ‘everything’, there are many options. Clearly,
the option of giving fresh frozen plasma and vitamin K was
not working. Had there been absolutely no other options
available, then the physicians would have been within their
rights to tell the family that ‘everything’ was being done.
However, there were more options. Common sense dictates
that a treatment for which the chances of beneficence are
greater than those of nonbeneficence, and with acceptable
risk comes under the broad rubric of ‘everything’, as defined
by most surrogates in this or similar circumstances.
If the family finds out that not all potential treatments were
discussed and that some options were unilaterally withheld,
then their response is likely to be anger. In the USA,
contemporary medical ethics mandates that patients and
family have much autonomy, and angry families who feel that
their autonomy has been compromised seek legal redress
much more frequently than do the rest of the global village.
This family might sue, not on the merits of the science but
because they are angry at having declared their ‘wishes’ for
what they consider reasonable treatment and then finding out
that those wishes were not followed. Presumably, they would
sue for punitive damages and not wrongful death.
Many attorneys have a mindset for ‘righting injustices’, and
not just compensating those who have suffered damage. The
argument would not be based on the merits of rVIIa as a
treatment but on the fact that it is the right of the patient and
family to demand it if the potential benefit outweighs the risk
and the obligation of the practitioner to provide it. There is no
strong precedent in current American law that will protect a
physician who unilaterally defies the wishes of the patient or
legitimate surrogate in a care plan. Once legal action begins,
it is virtually impossible to predict the outcome.
Therefore, it is my opinion that unilaterally withholding all
options from family consideration is a dangerous proposition.
The family should be informed about all options, and then
bright or dark pictures should be painted of some of the
options. In the end it is the family’s decision, aided by the
expert opinions of the physicians.Available online http://ccforum.com/content/10/5/231
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